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Modern history of Central and South-East Europe is filled with numerous 
integrating processes, which are the more numerous the more unrealistic 
they were in their conception. Perhaps it was a reaction to a gradual disin-
tegration of the three great empires spreading across the territory, i.e. the 
Ottoman, the tsarist and the Austrian-Hungarian Empires. In this region, a 
mosaic of small opposing nations, which almost always demanded neigh-
bouring territories from each other, was created.
The system of the Versailles Treaty somehow arranged the space 
between Germany and Italy on the one side, Russia (which had by then 
become the Soviet Union – nevertheless still imperialistic) on the other. 
This system, however, concerned both the victors and the defeated, thus 
handicapping the former over the latter and, as a result, initiating future 
disputes. Consequently, dreams of the democrats Masaryk, Paderewski 
and Ionescu regarding one “Zwischen-Europa” which would span the Bal-
tic and Aegean Seas, quickly dissolved when the nations of this European 
territory divided into two camps. The first camp included the winning par-
ties, which profited at the expense of the defeated parties and significantly 
extended their territories. The second camp included the defeated parties, 
which lost a great part of their territories. Certain facts, which these large, 
multinational nations had hitherto ignored (i.e. the unprecedented ethnic 
mixture unseen in other European regions) now appeared in full naked-
ness. As a result, the former of the above mentioned nations focused their 
policies on maintaining conditions stipulated by the system of the Ver-
sailles Peace Treaties, while the latter desired its revision. And since the 
great powers had been divided by the outcomes of World War I too, they 
looked for support primarily from the winning Entente Powers and then 
from the defeated powers or powers discontented with the new establish-
ment. Subsequently, Central, East and South-East Europe received new 
protectors – France from one side and Germany from the other side (the 
Soviet Union arrived in the 30s).
In the interwar period and during World War II, small and middle-
sized nations in both “camps” were pushed by the above-mentioned sense 
of threat or injustice to look for a great-power protector and power for 
safeguarding the acquired territories or acquiring the lost ones.
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The Little Entente and later the Balkan Pact present a typical ex-
ample of pacts of nations threatened by (border) revisions. Nations, which 
demanded revision of peace treaties, were represented by countries united 
under the so-called Roman Protocols. If we omit various schemes of “re-
gional collaboration”, the above-mentioned projects were the only ones 
more or less vital (at least in certain periods of time or particular spheres 
of activity). In other words, they were the sole concepts, which had a cer-
tain historical significance and left behind concrete traces, perhaps in peo-
ple’s subconsciousness.
Desperate efforts on the eve of World War II to create a kind of 
neutral bloc under the auspices of Italy or Great Britain were doomed from 
the very beginning because they wanted to unify the non-unifiable in a 
time of general danger of war (e.g. partners who were unable to yield a 
mere few kilometers of their territories to their neighbors even if collective 
interest demanded it).
During the war, there were numerous attempts to create blocs and 
alliances in both anti-Hitler coalitions and countries united under the Fas-
cist Axis (many of them ended as mere projects or ideas). The objectives 
were traditional: the former desired a return to the pre-war status quo, 
while the latter wanted to keep what they had acquired with the help of the 
Fascists. Some “salvage” projects appeared in the second stage of the war. 
All governments within this territory more or less accepted the necessity 
of defeating Hitlerism and searched for their collective salvation, f.e. by 
creating a Catholic bloc led by Italy, which was anxious to break away 
from the corrupt Axis.
The rather uncharacteristic relationship between Slovakia, Roma-
nia and Croatia stood slightly aside. These three satellite nations of Nazi 
Germany were united by territorial losses on behalf of Hungary (and of 
course a desire to regain these territories), and concerns about other Hun-
garian territorial demands. However, there was no desire to revert to the 
pre-war condition (at least as regards juridical standpoints); the idea of a 
return to pre-war unitary states was unacceptable for the Slovak and Croa-
tian separatists. However, these schemes share an unrealistic and even 
lofty stance with the above-mentioned plans.1
1 J. A. LUKACS was the first to point out this issue in his work The Great Powers and 
Eastern Europe1HZ<RUNSSII7KH6ORYDNKLVWRULDQďXERPtU/LSWiNSDLG
interest to while it in two essays published in the second half of the 1960’s, utilising ma-
terials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See L. LIPTÁK, 0DćDUVNRY slovenskej poli-
tike za druhej svetovej vojny, in: +LVWRULFNêþDVRSLV 1, 1967, pp. 1ff; L. LIPTÁK, Slovaki-
ja i strany Centralnoj Jevropy v period 1939–1944gg, in: Studia historica slovaca VI, 
1969, pp. 119–150. An essay by Miroslav Tejchman was based on Slovak and Rumanian 
archive materials. It was published in 6ORYDQVNê SĜHKOHG 2, 1992, pp. 158ff. A study 
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The independent Czechoslovak state disintegrated in March 1939 
and Yugoslavia disintegrated in April 1941. The “independent” Slovakia, 
i.e. the Slovak Republic, arose on the ruins of Czechoslovakia, while the 
“independent” Croatia arose on the ruins of Yugoslavia.2
Both Slovakia and Croatia were mere satellites. Slovakia was in-
ternally more stabilized and more or less resembled a nation. In the initial 
stages, the ruling ³ĐXGiFL´ managed to create a relatively stable and pros-
perous society and nation, which was initially able to protect itself from 
internal enemies. This was never achieYHG E\ 3DYHOLü¶V JRYHUQPHQW LQ
Croatia, which originated two years later.
Royal Romania did not disintegrate, but experienced significant 
changes as well. It lost some territories during the summer of 1940, but 
acquired others one year later, when it entered the war. Thus the only as-
pect, which connected Romania with the above-mentioned countries, was 
the fact that it also was a satellite, though undoubtedly more “independ-
ent”.
Each of these satellites lost something on behalf of Horthy’s Hun-
gary. Slovakia lost its southern territory after Munich and part of its east-
ern territory after March; Romania lost the northern part of Transylvania 
and Croatia lost Medjumurje. Now these three states had a common inter-
est in getting back their territories and losing no other territories to Hunga-
ry. At the same time, each state had its own maximalist plans, i.e. Great-
Croatian, Great-Romanian and Great-Slovakian programs, which were 
based on revenge against Hungary. They involved not only regaining what 
had been annexed, but also acquiring further “national territories”.
That the countries mentioned so far, i.e. Slovakia, Croatia, Roma-
nia and Hungary were in fact allies is another paradox. They all signed the 
Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact, which aspired to unify pro-
Fascist Europe under the Nazi leadership.
The foreign policy of Horthy’s government cherished the idea of re-
storing Hungary’s former regional supremacy. M. Kozma, Horthy’s private 
published in 1996 by Bucharest historian Florin Anghel was based entirely on Rumanian 
materials. F. ANGHEL, 2DOWHUQDWLYăGHFRODERUDUHvQLQWHULRUXO$[HL6SUHRQRXă0LFă
LQĠHOHJHUH–1944, in: 5HYLVWDLVWRULFă II, No. 3–4, 1996, pp. 233ff. The Prague histo-
rian Jan Rychlík was particularly concerned with Croatian-Slovakian relations during the 
World War in his latest study published in the magazine Slovanské historické studie 
2000, pp. 265–283. He used both Slovak and Croatian archive materials.
2 These quotation marks are not pejorative; rather they are skeptical because the inde-
pendence of both Slovakia and Croatia was strongly controversial. The former enjoyed a 
“protective agreement” with Germany and the latter had even two “protectors” – Italy 
and Germany. Just to be sure, the Italians militarily occupied half of the “Croatian inde-
pendent state”, which was included into the Italian protectorate by several bilateral 
agreements.
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palatine, acknowledged in a letter dated April 1939 that the chief objective 
was restoration of Great Hungary over the entire Carpathian basin. “For 
us, who adhere to the principles of St. Stephen’s ideas, who are not willing 
to sacrifice our one-thousand-year-old task in the Danube basin and who 
are predestined to lead foreign nations because we have all the potentials 
to achieve that, it would be murderous to give up this idea because it 
would consequently restrict Hungary on the Altföld territory and its Hun-
garian population..., the revision would not continue…and this would be 
suicidal for us, because the natural boundary lies along the Carpathian 
Ridge.“3
The Hungarian policy continuously ensured the Germans that 
Hungary was the only guarantee of order in the Danube area and the only 
reliable barrier against potential penetration by the Soviet army. When the 
Soviet-Romanian conflict about Bessarabia threatened to break out into 
open war in summer 1940, the idea of occupying east Slovakia and thus 
preventing the enemy from penetrating into the Danube basin appeared for 
the first time.4
From the onset of the Slovak state, the Hungarians searched for 
proofs of pan-Slavism in Bratislava and tried to persuade the Germans that 
Hungary was the only guarantee of order in the Danube region.5
The new borders of 1938–1941constituted a starting point for Bu-
dapest; for Slovakia, Romania and Croatia they represented more than the 
tolerable maximum. By decree of the first and second Vienna Award (i.e. 
southern Slovakia and north-western Transylvania) and by means of sim-
ple annexing acts LH&URDWLDQ0HÿLPXUMH9RMYRGLQD&DUSDWKLDQ5XWKe-
nia) Hungary achieved a significant portion of its revisionist program. 
However, Budapest was still hungry for further territories. It “showed in-
terest” in Serbian Banat after the defeat of Yugoslavia.
3 Quotation from: J. FABIAN, Slovensko v strednej Europe, in: Slovensko v rokoch 
druhej svetovej vojny, J. SKLADANÁ (Ed.), Bratislava 1991, p. 63.
4 Diplomáciai irátok Magyárország külpolitikájához 1936–1945, IV, Budapest 1962, No. 
583 and 583b. At the end of previous December, the leader of the Italian military intelli-
gence service Carboni warned Minister Ciano that Budapest was preparing military ac-
tions concerning Transylvania, which it would potentially justify by a Soviet attack or 
communist unrests in Transylvania. Documenti diplomatici italiani, IX, 9, No. 715, re-
port dated 25th December 1939. In spring 1940, the Hungarians declared that only strong 
Hungary in control the Carpathians could create a reliable barrier separating the Slavs. 
LIPTÁK, pp. 119–150, 178.
5 Bárdossy claimed in the Donauraum magazine that “the Hungarians were to be a 
stronghold against the east and west and were to maintain equilibrium in that space“.
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes (hereinafter PA AA), Büro des Staatssekretär 
(St.), Diplomatischen Besuche, R 29835, Bd. 10, Nr. 1563, verbal note of the Romanian 
government.
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Romania demanded the return of its territory and the Slovak government 
anticipated a revision of the arbitration, which would ensure recovery of at 
least some of the territory (the remaining territory would be resolved by 
exchange of population). The Zagreb government was hoping to get back 
0HÿLPXUMH&RXQW\ZKHUHWKH&URDWVFRQVWLWXWHGSHUFHQWRIWKHSRSu-
lation.6
This situation suited the Germans. All the nations were obliged to 
surpass each other in loyalty. The German government thus applied iden-
tical tactics of “partial satisfaction” to each satellite. Each satellite gained 
something from assisting the Germans – part of a territory demanded from 
a neighboring country, independence, etc. However, nobody was absolute-
ly satisfied in his or her demands and nobody was supposed to have a feel-
ing of total conclusiveness of the acquired advantage. Thus the Germans 
continued disputing the validity of the arbitration before the Romanians 
and, conversely, promised Serbian Banat to the Hungarians after the war.7
Nevertheless, this double-dealing policy by Berlin did not prevent 
the allies from separating into those who felt aggrieved and those who 
believed that the former were preferred (even though they also felt “in-
jured” by insufficient satisfaction of their demands – see Hungary and 
Bulgaria).
The Third Reich had its own ideas about the future of the New Eu-
rope, which were not always identical with ideas of the governments in 
Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia, Zagreb and Bratislava. German schemes im-
agined a predominantly German Europe and if anything, they allowed just 
small obedient satellites in the broad area of Central-East Europe (along-
side extensive strong points of German colonization on the Danube River). 
Strong, quarrelling states would have resulted in an unstable region. But 
stability in the region was important for the Reich as it supplied them with 
food and strategic materials and was important for the communication 
with Asia (via the Ukraine), the Middle East and Africa (via Thessaloni-
ki).
It was clear that both Slovakia and Croatia, which completely de-
pended on a foreign protector (i.e. Germany or Italy) and which were en-
dangered by Hungarian territorial appetite, searched for allies from the 
beginning of their existence. Bratislava did not much improve its relation 
6 A territory along the Mura River on the Slovenian-Croatian border (Medjumurje) was 
occupied by the Hungarian army during the April war against Yugoslavia under the pre-
tence of “keeping order”. By a unilateral treaty, it was connected to Hungary (it had been 
part of Hungary until 1918) in early July. The Hungarians also showed interest in the 
local oil resources, which yielded twenty-five tank cars of oil per day.
7 I. CHIPER, 2ELHFWLYH PLMORDFH úL PHWRGH DOH GLSORPDĠLHL URPkQH vQ DQXO , in: 
5HYLVWD,VWRULFă II, No. 3–4 1991, p. 7.
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towards Yugoslavia, which disintegrated in April 1941. Its orientation 
towards Poland, which was represented by Sidor, was even shorter and 
ended in September 1939. A more “logical” potential ally emerged with 
the creation of the “independent” Croatian state. Zagreb politicians were 
of a different nature than the politicians preceding them, who were often 
influenced by the “Czechoslovak spirit” and were more ideologically and 
politically acceptable for the new Slovak leaders.8
Even the new Slovak and Croatian establishment objected to the 
newly implemented “European order”. Hitler brought them to power, but 
constantly threatened them with his halfway decisions. Neither Bratislava 
nor Zagreb had enough power (or courage) to try and do something about 
it. They lacked any remedial concepts.
The third country was Romania, which was larger and militarily 
and economically more important. It lost Bessarabia in the summer of 
1940, then northern Transylvania to the second Vienna Award and finally 
south Dobrudja. Up to this national catastrophe, which deprived the Ro-
manian state of a great territory and large population, the Romanian king 
Carol II had been trying in vain to get a favorable response from the Na-
zis. His past association with the Little Entente made him an unacceptable 
partner for Hitler and Mussolini. However, when the Fascist-eager general 
Antonescu gained power, supported by the powerless new king Michael 
and a large portion of Romanian society who were eager to repair the “na-
tional catastrophe” of 1940, Hitler decided to grant guarantees to this cur-
tailed country because he needed its food, raw materials and its large ar-
my.
At the turn of the year 1940, Bucharest realized that currently it 
could only “settle up” with Hungary. In spring 1941, the new Romanian 
leader attempted to drag Slovakia into anti-Hungarian activities.
Foreign minister Mihai Antonescu invited the Slovak envoy Milecz 
for 13th January 1941 to inform him about their “common interest against 
Hungary”. He received Slovak foreign minister Tuka’s reply that said that 
it was too early since the time was totally unfavorable for any actions 
aimed at regaining their territories.9
Furthermore, a war on the Balkans was breaking out and Bratislava 
became concerned with speculations about its “neutrality”. Up to now, 
nobody has studied potential Hungarian contra-measures.
8 The Croatian policy was governed by the agrarian party, which was linked with Czech-
oslovak agrarians until April 1941. Its leaders refused to collaborate with the new Usta-
sche and their foreign protectors.
9 Slovenský národný archiv (hereinafter SNA), MZV, 192, political report No. 10 of 14th
)HEUXDU\   =DKUDQLþQR-politické záležitosti 1939–1944, 302239/II-1941; 
LIPTÁK, p. 12.
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Hungary confirmed its loyalty to Germany by promptly joining the 
war against the Soviet Union. At the start of July, Prime Minister Bar-
dossy proclaimed that Hungary would once again be able to fulfill its his-
torical role of a defendant of order of the Carpathian territory.
The Hungarian regent Horthy demanded a supervising role over 
the Danube territory during his visit to Hitler at the end of the year. He 
claimed that Hungary was “the only orderly and trustworthy nation in 
South-East Europe”.
With such proclamations, the Hungarians practically disputed the 
national existence of the Slovaks, Croats and Romanians and challenged 
national social principles. This statement appeared in a Romanian memo-
randum to the German government in October 1941. Unsurprisingly, these 
endangered parties responded again, once more prompted by Romania.
In early July 1941, the Romanian foreign minister Mihai Antones-
cu informed the Slovak envoy Milecz that it was necessary to create a sort 
of “cultural coalition” between both countries. He added that similar rela-
tions should be established with Croatia, too, but “without restoration of 
the Little Entente”.10
Antonescu informed the Zagreb government somewhat later. On 
7th August, he told the Croatian envoy Bulat that it was necessary to im-
mediately start working on mutual “cultural approximation” since “iden-
tical interests of the Romanian and Croatian population” demanded prep-
aration of a future protection of their common interests.11
The Croatian government was the first to agree to establish firm re-
lations and preparation for “unity of interest” in early September. The Slo-
vak government followed seven weeks later. In this way, concrete Roma-
nian – Croatian – Slovakian negotiations about trilateral collaboration 
commenced. For the public, the collaboration lay in the cultural and athlet-
ic spheres.
Trilateral negotiations were held in Bucharest in October 1941. 
They continued in Berlin, where leaders of the satellite countries gathered 
to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact.
The participants continuously ensured each other that they acted in 
their common interests; they did not wish to resolve any old issues and, in 
particular, did not want to inflame enmity towards Hungary at any cost.12
10 Biblioteca Centrala de Stat (thereinafter BCS), f. Sfântul Gheorghe (SG), LV, do 7, 
Convorbiri diplomatice 1–25 iulie 1941, 9-10, 9.7.1941.
11 BCS, SG, LV, dop.7, Convorbiri diplomatice 28 iulie–25 august 1941, pp. 8–9.
12 On 5th 1RYHPEHU$QWRQ3DYHOLüSURFODLPHGLQKLVGLDORJXHZLWKWKH5RPDQLDQ
envoy D. Buzdugan that “interests of our nations are identical and we have a common 
enemy”. Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, Bucharest, Fond 71/1920–1944, 
&URDĠLDYRO,I
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They merely argued that dealings about trilateral collaboration did not 
reproduce the “old ideals of the Little Entente” and were not in the least 
aimed against German interests. The three nations just wanted to reach a
consensus on their common problems.13
It was impossible to conceal the negotiations. Even before they 
commenced, Mihai Antonescu had informed Ribbentrop that the three 
governments desired a “mutual cultural exchange”. This cultural collabo-
ration was not seen as a political step against anybody or an attempt to 
breach the international obligations of Romania, Slovakia or Croatia.14
Berlin was informed about the conspired approximation of the 
three countries several weeks later by Councillor Stelzer. Antonescu never 
forgot to point out that it represented a mere “operational unity aimed at 
defending their common interests and regional approximation”. Berlin 
initially assured him that it would remain strictly neutral towards a poten-
tial regional alliance; it would neither support it nor publically reject it.15
The Hungarian foreign ministry informed Berlin about a “proposi-
tion to create a new Little Entente between Romania, Croatia and Slo-
vakia” directed against Hungary.16
Unlike Berlin, which assumed a rather neutral and seemingly ap-
peasing attitude, the Italian government strongly protested. It was con-
cerned with Croatian participation in the conspired regional alliance. In a 
protest note addressed to Berlin, the three governments were directly ac-
cused of “restoration of the spirit of the Little Entente and starting a new 
Little Entente, though with a different character”.17 Besides its traditional 
interest in a strong Hungary, Italy was probably worried about a potential 
increase of power in Croatia, which it considered to lie in its sphere of 
interest.
All this became evident in Budapest. The Hungarian government 
accused Romania, Slovakia and Croatia of “restoration of the Little En-
tente’s spirit” and reported it to Berlin.18
When the leader of the Romanian state Marshal Antonescu ap-
proached Hitler with a question concerning the fate of small countries af-
13 BCS, SG, LV, dop. 7, Convorbiri diplomatice 1–25 octombrie 1941.
14 BCS, SG, LVd, dop. 7, Convorbiri diplomatice, 12th July 1941.
15 BCS, SG, LXXVIII, InstrucĠioni date, 6 octombrie 1941.
16 PA AA, St.P., R 29665, 162025, Erdmannsdorf N.777 z 9. 7. 1941. Likewise R 29666, 
161412, Nr. 473 gRs, Berlin 20. 8. (delegate’s report from Pest).
17 SNA, MZV, 192, Political report No. 16/1942 dated 17th January 1942.
18 Quoted report by envoy Milecz dated 17th January.
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ter the war and even demanded a clear reply to his question,19 Berlin’s 
patience seemed to run out.
When a Slovak military delegation appeared in Bucharest in March 
1942, the envoy Killinger inquired whether this policy meant fulfillment 
of a kind of Einkreisungspolitik“20. This resulted in the Slovak govern-
ment’s retreat, which left Romania disappointed. The Slovaks were ac-
cused of pro-Hungarian policy by certain Romanians. The minister Tuka 
became very busy clearing up the Romanian doubts in several internal 
notifications.
Romanian-Croatian and Slovakian-Croatian negotiations had a 
similar course. The Nezavisna država hrvatska, however, was a weak 
SDUWQHU 3DYHOLü’s regime was not respected at home, let alone abroad. 
Consequently Zagreb dropped out of further considerations although it 
was far more disposed to regional collaboration.
This does not, however, mean that Bratislava started ignoring Cro-
atia. Ostentatious fraternizing celebrations were organized between the 
ĐXGiFL guardsmen and the Croatian Ustaše; there were certain military 
contacts (supplies of weaponry and outfits from Slovak army warehouses 
to the Croatian militia), but the southern flank of the conspired trilateral 
agreement practically failed.
Further dealings, held in May 1942, were initiated by Mihai An-
tonescu. He claimed that even the small Axis states must make ready for 
the future peace in the framework of regional alliance. He even claimed 
that the Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels regarded his scheme favorably. Ini-
tially, they were supposed to coordinate propaganda and promote and ex-
change confidential information. Similar schemes stemmed from the con-
viction that the upcoming German offensive on the Eastern Front would 
lead to the final defeat of the Soviet Union and end of the war.
It seems, however, that Bratislava was not so optimistic. It certain-
ly did not hurry and wanted to proceed with this restricted form of alli-
ance. The Zagreb government showed great interest, but it was a partner 
too weak for any final settlements.
19 In his memorandum, Antonescu pointed out the great losses of the Romanian army on 
the eastern front and enquired why “the purely intellectual fraternisation” between Ro-
mania, Croatia and Slovakia was regarded with such cool reservations. Cf.: minutes from 
discussions between Ion Antonescu and Hitler on 11th February 1942. In.: A. HILGRU-
BER, Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler, II, Franfurt a. M. 1970, p. 44. About the 
memorandum’s content: SNA, MZV, 192, political report No. 59/42/pol dated 10th March 
1942.
20 SNA, MZV, 192, political report No. 64/42 dated 16th March. A. Hitler enjoyed using 
the mentioned term when he attacked British efforts between 1939 and 1940 regarding a 
joint front against Fascist aggressors.
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In early February 1943, the Romanian government urged Bratisla-
va to restore Romanian-Slovakian collaboration, which “started in such a 
promising way”. Minister Antonescu only added that he did not under-
stand why Germany feared political collaboration between both nations 
because “such regional alliance was in German interest”.21 Shortly af-
terwards, Antonescu received a letter from his Slovak colleague Dr. V. 
Tuka, who regarded Romania the only nation (except for Germany, of 
course) from which Slovakia could expect “fundamental and effective 
assistance”.22
In September 1943, initiative arrived from Bratislava for the first 
time. The envoy Milecz turned to M. Antonescu with a request in which 
he asked Romania for help if Hungary attempted to occupy Slovakia. He 
received a positive answer.23
Budapest’s reaction was swift again. At the end of January 1943, 
the Hungarian envoy delivered a memorandum to Berlin in which he in-
formed about Romanian efforts to create a new Little Entente (“einer klei-
neren Entente”) between Romania, Slovakia and Croatia. He claimed that 
a historic partnership (“Schicksalsgemeinschaft”) between the Romanian 
and Croatian nations was emphasized in all the media and that in certain 
Slovak circles “prospects were awoken for the creation of a Little En-
tente” (“zur Errichtung einer kleineren Entente”).24
A memorandum of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs dat-
ed 16th April stated: “we are feeling threatened by enemies – the spirit of 
the Little Entente haunts our population. It is our mission to safeguard the 
Carpathian territory (Karpatenraums), which also forms an economical 
unity. We have the following tasks in the area:
1) to act as Ordnungsstaat in the heart of Europe,
2) to achieve historical boundaries by peaceful means,
3) to support economically the fighting Axis in its war against the 
Soviet union, 
4) to develop a diplomatic activity in the interest of the Axis and 
its war against communism and fulfillment of our historical 
mission”.25
Bi-and tri-lateral Slovakian-Romanian-Croatian contact was real-
ized in three stages.
21 SNA, MZV, 193, political report No. 41/43/pol dated 3rd February 1943.
22 Tuka’s letter to Mihai Antonescu dated 17th February 1943. ANGHEL2DOWHUQDWLYăGH
FRODERUDUHvQLQWHULRUXO$[HL6SUHRQRXă0LFăvQĠHOHJHUH
23 SNA, MZV, 193, political report No. 173/43/pol dated 8th September 1943.
24 PA AA, fond Unterstaatssekretär (U.St.S), 184118, Pol. Nr. 72, 28. 1. 1943.
25 Allianz Hitler, Horthy, Mussolini. Dokumente zur ung. Aussenpolitik (1933–1944),
Budapest, 1966, No. 118, pp. 336–339.
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The first, from summer 1941 until winter 1941/42 was character-
ized by permanent collaboration in political, economical and cultural 
spheres, which ended after the German intervention.
The second stage (1942 until well into the second half of 1943) 
was represented by intense Romanian-Croatian solidarity. In late 1942 it 
seemed that the alliance would really be signed, but Rome intervened, 
because it traditionally considered Hungary the number one in the region 
and regarded Croatia its own territory.
In the final stage (autumn 1943) collaboration floundered and mu-
tual relations cooled. It was partially caused by the German intervention in 
Croatia, the collapse of Italy and most importantly the changing course of 
war in Europe.
It must be pointed out that the policy of mutual fraternization of the 
three Central-East European satellites never disputed the Axis. The pro-
tagonists of alliance policy in Bratislava, Bucharest and Zagreb never im-
peached affiliation of their nations with the Fascist Axis. They always 
acted within its framework and respected potential German or Italian 
grudges.
The conspired tripartite fraternization never had an offensive char-
acter or intention to surround Hungary (it was even impossible because 
they did not share any boundaries with the country). They desired territo-
ries, which Hungary had annexed with the help of the Axis and protection 
from further Hungarian demands.
The fate of the wartime flirt with Romanian-Slovakian-Croatian al-
liance was much like the fate of the Little Entente. It was spurred by its 
fear of Hungary (and a common effort to regain territories which Hungary 
had taken with the help of Germany). What remained was failure, inability 
to create an alliance in defending their mutual interests and an episode of 
the satellites’ desire to do more independent policy. Some terminology 
still survives: firstly, the moment a hint of trilateral collaboration ap-
peared, the afflicted party immediately condemned the three states of 
“restoration of the Little Entente spirit”.26 Secondly, the moment trilateral 
negotiations commenced, tradition of former collaboration was pointed 
out in salutary notes.
Just as the Little Entente fell in a series of more or less successful 
events and integrating experiments in the interwar period, so the Romani-
an-Slovakian-Croatian collaboration efforts fell in a long series of similar 
26 A similar situation was last repeated in 1968. After Tito’s and Ceausescu’s visit to 
Prague, the term Little Entente appeared not only in Czechoslovak media, but also in 
accusations against reformers from East Germany and some other countries of the War-
saw Pact.
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experiments and projects of World War II. There were a large number of 
them in both the winning and the losing camps. Concerning the former, we 
can mention federalization projects promoted by Great Britain, which dis-
integrated into a torso of a Czechoslovak-Polish and Yugoslav-Greek trea-
ties; concerning the latter, there were various speculations concerning the 
creation of a Catholic bloc under the auspice of Italy.
Abstract
The revisions of Hungarian boarders in the years 1939–1941 caused con-
siderable dissatisfaction among the countries which had to cede consider-
able territories to the government in Budapest. Therefore these states 
(Rumania, Slovakia and Croatia) attempted to resurrect the idea of the 
Little Entente which sought to prevent Hungarian revisionism in the in-
terwar era. However Budapest had German support – therefore the efforts 
of the countries to form some sort of anti-Hungarian block came to noth-
ing.
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